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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

Case No. 20030704-CA

vs.
DON ENOCH PETERSON,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from conviction for Don Enoch Peterson for one count of Child Abuse, a
Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-109(3)(a) (2003), in the Third
District Court, the Honorable Judge Lindberg presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(2001).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Question One

1.

Whether the trial court was right in denying the appellant's motion for directed
verdict and concluding that the evidence was sufficient to send the case to the
jury. Also whether the evidence given supported the subsequent guilty verdict
returned by the jury.
Standard of Review. "We review a challenge that there was insufficient
evidence to warrant sending the case to the jury under 'the same standard

applied to a claim that insufficient evidence exists to support a jury verdict.'
State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989). Thus, to reverse a jury
verdict we must find that 'the evidence to support the verdict was completely
lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly
unreasonable and unjust. State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, Tfl9, 999 P.2d 565
(citation and internal quotations omitted)." 2002 UT App. 348, ^[52.
Question Two
2.

Whether the jury properly inferred that the appellant intentionally or
knowingly injured his child when he grabbed the two-year-old child by the
throat.
Standard of Review. "We review a challenge that there was insufficient
evidence to warrant sending the case to the jury under 'the same
standard applied to a claim that insufficient evidence exists to
support a jury verdict.' State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah
1989). Thus, to reverse a jury verdict we must find that 'the evidence
to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and
unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust.
State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, ^[19, 999 P.2d 565 (citation and internal
quotations omitted)." 2002 UT App. 348, ^[52.
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The following statutes, rules, or constitutional provisions whose interpretation is relevant
to this appeal are attached at addendum A:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 25, 2003, appellant was charged with one count of child abuse, a Class A
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH

CODE ANN.

§ 76-5-109 (2003). R.l. On July 14, 2003, the

Honorable Denise P. Lindberg denied the appellant's motion for directed verdict. R.70: 66.
Subsequently, on July 14,2003, the appellant was found guilty of one count of child abuse. R.49.
On August 26, 2003, the appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. R.52-53.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
On November 27th, 2002, Andrea Campbell dropped off her two-year-old son, Mathew
Campbell, at the home of the parents of the appellant, Don Peterson. R.70: 35-36. The
appellant and his mother were to watch the child, who was the appellant's son, from about
9:00 am to 4:00 pm while Ms. Campbell was at work. R.70: 35-36, 71. Ms. Campbell came
back to pick up the child from the appellant's house between 3:00 and 4:00pm. R.70: 36.
When Ms. Campbell picked up her two-year-old, she noticed that he had bruises on both sides
of his neck. R.70: 36. Appellant initially told her that the bruises came from wrestling.
R.70:36. When Ms. Campbell began questioning the appellant about the bruises, he was

1

Except as otherwise noted, this brief recites the facts in the light most favorable to the
jury's verdict. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, H 2, 12 P.3d 92.

3

acting funny and would not look her in the eyes. R.70: 36. After being questioned for half an
hour, the appellant changed his story and admitted that he had caused the marks on the child's
neck when he picked the two-year-old up and put him back in the chair. R.70: 36, 40.
Appellant related the following story to Ms. Campbell and then to the police. Around
noon, the appellant and his mother made lunch for the child in the kitchen. R.70: 72. While
the child was eating his lunch the appellant's mother left out the back door to get something
from a trailer on the side of the house. R.70: 73. The child initially wanted to follow his
grandmother but the appellant told him to eat his lunch. R.70: 73. After a few minutes the
child quickly got up and went running towards the door his grandmother had used. R.70: 73.
The appellant got up and went running after the child to stop him. R.70: 73. After telling the
child to stay and eat his lunch, the appellant reached out and grabbed the child by the neck
forcefully enough to cause instant bruising and red marks. R.70: 73-74. He then dragged the
child back to his seat by the neck. R.70: 75. Appellant said he grabbed the two-year-old by the
neck and the shoulder. R.70:74-75.
At about 9:00 pm two officers of the Midvale City Police Department were dispatched to
the home of Andrea Campbell. R.70: 52. The two officers examined the child and took three
photographs of the injuries on the appellant's neck. R.70: 48-50. Ms. Campbell identified the
pictures in court, saying that the marks were actually darker, like dark red blood blisters, so that a
person could see where fingers had been placed on the two-year-old's neck. R:70:38-39, 42.
Officer Woffinden observed red marks on the two-year-old's neck but saw no marks on the twoyear-old's arm. R.70:50-51, 61.
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After the officers arrived back at the station one of them, Officer Woffinden spoke to the
appellant on the phone. R.70: 77. After Officer Woffinden told the appellant who he was and that
he was calling about the child, the appellant identified the child as his son. R.70: 53. Officer
Woffinden then told the appellant that he was concerned about the marks on the neck of the
child. The appellant told the officer in answer to this question that "he had lost it." The Appellant
went on to explain his version of the events that led up to his grabbing the child and told Officer
Woffinden that he needed help with his anger. R.70:54. The appellant also told the officer that he
had been going to domestic violence counseling but that he had run out of money and had quit
going. R.70: 54. The appellant ended by saying he needed help with his anger and should not be
locked up. R.70: 54.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
At the close of the State's case, the appellant motioned for a directed verdict claiming
there was insufficient evidence to send the case to the jury. R. 70:66. The trial court denied the
appellant's motion determining there was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to determine
the factual issue as to whether the appellant intentionally harmed his child. R. 70:67. The
appellant now claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss and that there
was insufficient evidence to convict him. Specifically, the appellant argues that the State did
not prove that the appellant intentionally harmed his child when he grabbed him by the throat.
However, the appellant's argument fails because the jury properly inferred that the appellant
had the requisite intent required under Utah Code. Ann. § 76-5-109(3)(a)(2003).
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I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY SUBMITTED THE CASE TO THE
JURY BECAUSE THE STATE ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE
CASE, PRODUCING PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE INJURIES AND AN
ADMISSION BY THE APPELLANT THAT HE CAUSED THEM.
"In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to send a case to the jury, the
court uses the same standard as for a claim of insufficient evidence to support a jury verdict."
State v. Taylor, 884 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d
1221, 1225 (Utah 1989)). "[A]ppellate courts should 'uphold the trial court's decision if, upon
reviewing the evidence and all inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it, [the court]
conclude[s] that some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that the
elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.5" IdL "Therefore, a motion
for a directed verdict made at the close of the state's case may be denied if the trial court finds
that the State has established a 'prima facie case against the appellant by producing
'believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged.'" State v. Montoya, 2004 UT 5,
If 29, 84 P.3d 1183, 1190 (quoting State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1992)). All
evidence from the trial court is "viewed in the light most favorable to the state." Id. (quoting
Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, f 16, 990 P.2d 933 (stating, '"When reviewing any
challenge to a trial court's denial of a motion for directed verdict, we review the evidence and
all reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
party moved against. .. .'"). The question of intent is for the trier of fact, not the judge. See
State v. Minousis, 228 P. 574, 577 (Utah 1924) (stating, "As to whether or not the specific
intent existed in the mind of the accused is a question of fact to be submitted to and
determined by the jury from all the evidence in the case and the inferences to be drawn
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therefrom, and is not a matter of legal presumption.).
In this case, the State presented a prima facie case by presenting photographic
evidence of the injuries to the child, testimony that the appellant admittedly grabbed his child
by the throat, stating that he "lost it," and that the appellant admitted that he had a problem
with anger. Thus, with all inferences in favor of the State, the trial judge concluded that there
was sufficient evidence for the jury to determine the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.
II. THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION SHOULD BE UPHELD
SINCETHE JURY PROPERLY INFERRED THAT THE APPELLANT
INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY INJURED HIS CHILD WHEN
HE GRABBED THE TWO-YEAR-OLD BY THE THROAT.
The Utah Supreme Court stated:
When we examine a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury
verdict, we review the evidence and all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the jury verdict. We also assume that the jury believed the
evidence that supports the verdict. We will reverse a jury conviction "for insufficient
evidence 'only if the evidence presented at trial is so insufficient that reasonable minds
could not have reached the verdict.'" Further, in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence, we refuse to "re-evaluate the credibility of the witnesses or second-guess the
jury's conclusion." State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67, \ 40, 52 P.3d 1194, 1204
(citations omitted).
The appellant was appropriately convicted of child abuse because the State proved all
the elements of the statute for which he was charged. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(3),
provides, "Any Person who inflicts upon a child physical injury or, having the care or custody
of such child, causes or permits another to inflict physical injury upon a child is guilty of an
offense as follows: "(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a class A
misdemeanor

" Utah Code Ann § 76-2-103, provides, "A person engages in conduct:
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(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.
(2) A person acts knowingly or with knowledge, with respect to the result of his
conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the
result."
Utah Code Ann § 76-2-104(3), provides, "If acting knowingly is sufficient to establish the
culpable mental state for an element of an offense, that element is also established if a person
acts intentionally."
In State v. Peterson, the defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon. 453
P.2d 696, 696-97 (Utah 1969). The defendant argued that the statute required a showing that
he had the specific intent to commit the offense. The Supreme Court disagreed stating:
With respect to the intent: It is true that the State was unable to prove directly what
was in the defendant's mind relative to doing harm to the victim; and that he in fact
denied having any such intent. However, his version does not establish the fact, nor
does it even necessarily raise sufficient doubt to vitiate the conviction. If it were so, it
would lie within the power of a defendant to defeat practically any conviction which
depended upon his state of mind. As against what he says, it is the jury's privilege to
weigh and consider all of the facts and circumstances shown in evidence in
determining what they will believe. This includes not only what was said and what
was done, but also the drawing of reasonable inferences from the conduct shown,
which in this instance they may well have regarded as speaking louder than the
defendant's defensive claims as to what his intentions were. This is in accord with
the elementary rule that a person is presumed to intend the natural and probable
consequences of his acts.).
In State v. Maestas, the Utah Supreme Court further stated:
Because of the near impossibility of proving intent directly, Utah law clearly permits
the inference of such intent from the actions of the defendant considered in light of the
surrounding circumstances. This Court has stated: The argument that the state did not
prove the defendant's specific intent to committed the crimes charged ignores two
well-settled principles. The first is that the jury can find not only the facts shown
directly by the evidence, but also such additional facts as may reasonably be inferred
therefrom. 652 P.2d 903, 906 (1982),
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Assuming in arguendo that the circumstantial evidence alone is not sufficient to find
the appellant intentionally grabbed the child by the throat, the direct evidence of the bruises to
the neck point to the necessary intent. In murder cases, it has been found that the injuries
sustained by the victim can establish intent. State v. James, 891 P.2d 781 at 790 (Utah 1991).
In James, the defendant was charged for murder under a statute that required intentional
conduct for conviction. Id. at 788. Since there was no direct evidence of intentional conduct,
the trial court was forced to infer the intent from the injuries sustained by the victim coupled
with circumstantial evidence. In examining this decision the Supreme Court looked to other
similar cases and found that "in the majority of cases, evidence of intent is generally supplied
by evidence of the injury by which the victim died or of the act which caused the death." Id. at
790. However, the Supreme Court did not find this evidence sufficient in James, and instead
concluded that intent was established "from the overall circumstances of the death." Id. at
792. Using this information, the Supreme Court upheld the finding of intentional conduct
based upon the facts of the case.
The court also found that injuries can supply intent in a more factually similar case. In
State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, f 74, 28 P.3d 1278, 1293, the defendant was charged with
intentional infliction of serious physical injury upon a child that caused her death in violation
of §76-5-203(l)(d) (1999) and §76-5-109(2)(a) (1999) of the Utah Code. In upholding
defendant's conviction, the Supreme Court found the evidence in the case sufficient to
establish the requisite intent. Ibid. The Court held that the finding of intentional conduct was
supported by "overwhelming medical evidence and lay testimony." Id. at f76. The evidence
9

itself "suggested that [the victim's] injuries were non-accidental..." Ibid.
The physical evidence in the present case also establishes overwhelmingly that the
appellant meant to grab the child by the throat. When the pictures of the child's injuries are
examined, the appellant's finger marks are clearly visible on the neck. If the appellant's
contention that he meant to grab the child by the shoulders and his hands slipped up the throat
is to be believed, the injuries would be different. The marks would surely be less defined and
there might even be markings from the sliding of the appellant's fingers up the neck of the
child and on the child's shoulder. Instead, the finger marks are consistent with the appellant's
grabbing the neck of the two-year-old from the front and closing his fingers around it
intentionally. Also, there were no marks on the child's shoulder. Based upon this physical
evidence, the jury was justified in finding that the appellant intentionally grabbed the child by
the throat.
Even if the appellant had no intent to injure initially, the act of grabbing a two-year-old
child by the throat and then carrying or dragging the two-year-old back to his chair has to be
seen by anyone as likely to result in injury to the child. Indirect evidence is also known as
circumstantial evidence. See State v. Vance,l\0 P. 434, 449 (Utah 1910) J. Staup dissenting
(circumstantial evidence is frequently termed indirect evidence). In Utah, "[i]t is well settled
in this state that 'a conviction can be based on sufficient circumstantial evidence.'" State v.
Lyman, 966 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 344
(Utah 1997)).
In this case, the State proved the appellant's requisite intent or knowledge by
introducing evidence of: the injuries, the appellant's admission that he caused the injuries, and
10

.,y

.t.

.•

:.,.d an anger problem and "lost it" when he grabbed his

child by the throat. From all the evidence, the jury determined that the appellant acted
intentionally or knowingly when he grabbed his child by the throat and carried or dragged the
two-year-old back to his chair causing the inji iries
CONCLUSION
BUN
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RESPECTFULLY submitted on this 9th day of July, 2004.
DAVID YOLUM
Salt Lake Citron I) -t

UU>HU-;.

,-"7

layiock
ty District Attorney
'ttorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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Addendum A
Utah Code Aon. §76-2-103 (2003)
^ :. 0 Definitions

(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or
to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the
conduct or cause the result.
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to circumstances
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or
the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must
be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as
viewedfrom.,the actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to circumstances
surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur.
The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a
gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise in all
the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.

History: (

i 053, 76-2-103, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-103; 1974, ch. 32, § 4.
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Utah Code Ann. §76-5-109 (2003)
§76-5-109 Child Abuse
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Child" means a human being who is under 18 years of age.
(b) "Child abuse" means any offense described in Subsection (2) or (3), or in Section
76-5-109.1.
(c) "Physical injury" means an injury to or condition of a child which impairs the
physical condition of the child, including:
(i) a bruise or other contusion of the skin;
(ii) a minor laceration or abrasion;
(iii) failure to thrive or malnutrition; or
(iv) any other condition which imperils the child's health or welfare and which is not
a serious physical injury as defined in Subsection (l)(d).
(d) "Serious physical injury" means any physical injury or set of injuries which seriously
impairs the child's health, or which involves physical torture or causes serious
emotional harm to the child, or which involves a substantial risk of death to the child,
including:
(i) fracture of any bone or bones;
(ii) intracranial bleeding, swelling or contusion of the brain, whether caused by
blows, shaking, or causing the child's head to impact with an object or surface;
(iii) any burn, including burns inflicted by hot water, or those caused by placing a
hot object upon the skin or body of the child;
(iv) any injury caused by use of a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1601;
(v) any combination of two or more physical injuries inflicted by the same person,
either at the same time or on different occasions;
(vi) any damage to internal organs of the body;
(vii) any conduct toward a child which results in severe emotional harm, severe
developmental delay or retardation, or severe impairment of the child's ability to
function;
(viii) any injury which creates a permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or
impairment of the function of a bodily member, limb, or organ;
(ix) any conduct which causes a child to cease breathing, even if resuscitation is
successful following the conduct; or
14

(x) any conduct which results in starvation or failure to thrive or
malnutrition that jeopardizes the child's life
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child serious physical injury or, having the care or custody
of such child, causes or permits another to inflict serious physical injury upon a child is guilty
of an offense as follows:
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a felony of the second degree;
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a felony of the third degree; or
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense i^ a <** *ss A misdeme;:!v
(3) Any person who inflicts upon a child physical injury or, having the care or custody of
such child, causes or permits another to inflict physical injury upon a child is guilty of an
offense as follows:
(a) if done intentionally or 'knowingly, the uuciise is a class A misdemeanor;
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a class B misdemeanor; or
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class C misdemen
(4) A parent or legal guardian who provides a child with treatment by spiritual means alone
through prayer, in lieu of medical treatment, in accordance with the tenets and practices of an
established church or religious denomination of which the parent or legal guardian is a
member or adherent shall not, for that reason alone, be deemed to have committed an offense
under this section.

History: C. 1953, 76-5-109, enacted by L. 1981, ch. 64, § 1; 1992, ch. 192, § 1; 1997, ch.
289, § 5; 1997, ch. 303, ? 2: 1 ™>9 ch <*! ? ' • !<)oo. c]^ 67, § 1; 2000, ch 125, § 1.
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